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Abstract To conclude that there is enough or not 
enough evidence demonstrating that deep brain stimula- 
tion (DBS) causes unintended postoperative personality 
changes is an epistemic problem that should be answered 
on the basis of established, replicable, and valid data. If 
prospective DBS recipients delay or refuse to be im- 
planted because they are afraid of suffering from person- 
ality changes following DBS, and their fears are based on 
unsubstantiated claims made in the neuroethics literature, 
then researchers making these claims bear great respon- 
sibility for prospective recipients' medical decisions and 
subsequent well-being. Our article “Deflating the ‘DBS 
causes personality’ bubble” reported an increase in theo- 
retical neuroethics publications suggesting putative DBS- 
induced changes to personality, identity, agency, autono- 
my, authenticity and/or self (PIAAAS) and a critical lack 
of supporting primary empirical studies. This special 
issue of Neuroethics brings together responses to our 
initial publication, with our own counter-responses orga- 
nized according to common themes. We provide a brief 
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summary for each commentary and its main criticisms as 
well as a discussion of the way in which these responses 
can: 1) help clarify the meaning of PIAAAS, suggesting 
supplementary frameworks for understanding the impact 
of DBS on PIAAAS; 2) provide further empirical evi- 
dence of PIAAAS by presenting results from the re- 
searchers’ own work; and/or 3) offer a critique of our 
research approach and/or findings. Unintended postoper- 
ative putative changes to PIAAAS remain a critical eth- 
ical concern. It is beyond dispute that we need to develop 
reliable empirical and conceptual instruments able to 
measure complex cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
changes in order to investigate whether they are attribut- 
able to DBS alone. 
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Current philosophical and neuroethical discussions on the 
putative effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on per- 
sonality, identity, agency, autonomy, authenticity and/or 
self (PIAAAS) turn on a crucial epistemological question: 
whether or not DBS causes unintended postoperative 
PIAAAS changes. Although the answer to this question 
does not always, it should always have a direct bearing on 
conclusions concerning what should (or should not) be 
ethically prescribed. Indeed, the very existence of a po- 
tential link between DBS and unintended postoperative 
PIAAAS changes suggests that certain moral obligations 
or prescriptions may be derived for these practices. For 
instance, medical and scientific authorities believe that 
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frontal lobectomy contributes to unsafe irrevocable alter- 
ation of personality. Therefore, they have put in place 
bans and other measures to prevent this invasive brain 
intervention. But to be meaningful, our neuroethical pre- 
scriptions need to be based on epistemic certainties. In the 
case of frontal lobectomy, prevalence studies have indi- 
cated that the risk of unsafe irreversible personality 
changes, among other adverse effects, outweigh the ben- 
efits. Neuroethicists’ discussions are sometimes refer- 
enced in public forums (e.g. the media) or honoured by 
individuals as having epistemic authority, generating con- 
clusions that are rarely free of societal consequences. 
Prospective DBS recipients consulting and reading our 
discussions may be influenced by our conclusions when 
deciding whether to seek DBS surgery. If prospective 
DBS recipients delay or refuse to be implanted because 
they are afraid of suffering from personality changes 
following DBS, and their fear is generated from reading 
unsubstantiated conclusions in the neuroethics literature, 
then our conclusions bear great responsibility on the 
medical decisions and subsequent well-being of these 
patients. To conclude that there is enough or not enough 
evidence to show that DBS causes unwanted postopera- 
tive personality changes is an epistemic problem that 
should be answered on the basis of established, replica- 
ble, and valid data. 
In our article “Deflating the ‘DBS causes personality’ 
bubble” [1], we found a critical lack of primary empir- 
ical studies supporting putative DBS-induced changes 
in PIAAAS, and we observed an increase in the number 
of theoretical neuroethics publications suggesting a link. 
Part of our approach involved critically assessing the 
evidence for these claims and conclusions. Given the 
low number of first-hand primary studies and large 
number of marginal and single case reports referenced 
in the theoretical neuroethics debates, we pointed out the 
existence of a DBS-PIAAAS bubble, which may need 
to be deflated due to limited empirical evidence. 
This special issue of Neuroethics brings together 
responses to our initial publication [1], with our own 
counter-responses organized according to common 
themes. We provide a brief summary for each commen- 
tary and its main criticisms as well as a discussion of the 
way in which these responses can help further clarify, 
add evidence, and contribute to deliberations on how 
and to what extent DBS therapy affects the PIAAAS of 
recipients. We have grouped the responses according to 
whether they: 1) clarify the meaning of PIAAAS, sug- 
gesting supplementary frameworks for understanding 
the impact of DBS on PIAAAS; 2) provide empirical 
evidence of PIAAAS by presenting results from the 
researchers’ own work; and/or 3) criticise our research 
approach and/or findings. A summary of each response, 
along with a classification according to its role or pur- 
pose in the “DBS causes PIAAAS changes” debate is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Clarifying the Meaning of PIAAAS 
 
A number of responses have provided additional frame- 
works in which the impact of DBS on PIAAAS can be 
analysed. For instance, Gaillard [2] presents two differ- 
ent levels of relevant analyses. Acknowledging that 
DBS is a technology that directly manipulates the brain, 
an organ essential for identity and personality, and si- 
multaneously a medical intervention that modifies the 
living conditions of its recipients through symptom 
relief provides a basis for reconciling various narratives 
on how DBS causes PIAAAS changes and for 
conducting integrative research that fosters multiple 
perspectives via multidisciplinary approaches. In terms 
of facilitating integrative research to address the ques- 
tion of whether DBS causes unwanted PIAAAS chang- 
es, Kubu et al. [3] suggest the adoption of a pragmatic 
bioethical framework, which encourages open delibera- 
tion and empirical inquiry. Although the use of data 
from primary research involving DBS recipients is im- 
portant, Pugh et al. [4] mention that there are cases when 
there is no first hand evidence to draw on for ethical 
analysis. In these instances, Pugh et al. [4] suggest the 
use of mechanism-based reasoning, which draws upon 
existing empirical work on the role of neural networks 
that are targeted by DBS, and the role that these net- 
works play in psychopathology and human psycholog- 
ical traits. 
Other responses have focused on specific aspects of 
PIAAAS and have suggested ways through which 
PIAAAS can be better operationalised. Erler [5] ex- 
plains how the concepts of identity, authenticity, and 
autonomy are amenable to empirical inquiry. He high- 
lights how philosophical conceptions of these terms can 
be used to design quantitative studies that capture 
changes to the DBS recipient’s identity, authenticity, 
and autonomy. Zuk and Lazaro-Muñoz [6] echo a sim- 
ilar approach and discuss how traditional, experiential, 
and relational conceptions of autonomy can be used to 
develop an instrument that evaluates the direction, 
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Table 1 Main arguments presented by responses to our article on "Deflating the Deep Brain Stimulation Causes Personality Changes 
Bubble" [1] 
Author/s (Year) Title Purpose of response Main arguments and/or findings 
 
 
Gaillard (2019) Neuroessentialism, our Technological 
Future, and DBS Bubbles 
Clarifying PIAAAS: ways or 
narratives in which the effect of 
DBS on PIAAAS can be framed 
The “DBS causes PIAAAS” bubble 
can be viewed through a brain 
narrative and/or a context 
narrative, with each narrative 
representing a different level in 
which DBS may exert its effects. 
Contentions in neuroethics 
discussions could be a result of 
ethicists examining only one 
narrative and ignoring the other. 





Pragmatism and the Importance of 
Interdisciplinary Teams in 
Investigating Personality Changes 
Following DBS 





Empirical evidence: effect of DBS on 
personality and control 
A pragmatic framework can be used 
to address the questions on 
whether DBS causes PIAAAS 
changes and to bridge conceptual 
and empirical neuroethics. 
Results from their two previous 
studies show how DBS can 
improve patients’ perceptions of 
control in their life and how PD is 
perceived to lead to more 
significant and negative changes in 
personality than DBS. 
Erler (2019) Discussions of DBS in Neuroethics: 
Can We Deflate the Bubble Without 
Deflating Ethics? 
Clarifying PIAAAS: empirical 
investigation of autonomy, 
authenticity, and identity 
 
Criticism: ethical significance of these 
concepts despite lack of empirical 
grounding 
Identity, authenticity, and autonomy 
are amenable to empirical inquiry 
through the help of philosophical 
conceptions of these constructs. 
Some PIAAAS components may be 
irreducibly normative and cannot 
be fully operationalised or 
reduced; however, these do not 
make them less respectable 




It’s Not Just Counting that Counts: a 
Reply to Gilbert, Viaña, and 
Ineichen 
Criticism: search strategy used; 
exclusion of case reports; limitation 
of quantitative instruments, 
randomised controlled trials, and 
incidence rates 
The search terms severely restricted 
the initial set of results. 
Case studies should not be dismissed, 
for they help inform theoretical 
papers that can illustrate important 
features and normative 
implications of DBS-related 
changes. 
Randomised controlled trials are bad 
at identifying rare side effects and 
do not give information about 
factors that influence PIAAAS 
experiences. 
PIAAAS instruments will not 
accurately reflect or capture 
patients’ experiences. 
Incidence rates tell very little about 
the nature of PIAAAS changes or 
the best way to help patients cope 
with them. 
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Table 1 (continued) 





































Evidence-Based Neuroethics, Deep 
Brain Stimulation and Personality - 





















DBS and Autonomy: Clarifying the 





‘Woe Betides AnybodyWho Tries to 
Turn me Down.’ A Qualitative 
Analysis of Neuropsychiatric 
Symptoms Following Subthalamic 
Deep Brain Stimulation for 
Parkinson’s Disease 
Clarifying PIAAAS: levels of 
evidence and mechanism-based 




Criticism: limitation of RCTs in 
detecting causality; 
mechanism-based reasoning sug- 
gests that DBS can affect authentic- 













Clarifying PIAAAS: scale for 





Empirical evidence: impact of DBS for 
PD on autonomy, authenticity, and 
identity 
RCTs might not be able to tell us 
whether or not DBS directly 
causes personality changes; 
within-patient comparisons might 
provide evidence needed for the 
“DBS causes PIAAAS” question. 
The most significant question is not 
about causality but rather the 
extent to which the effects of DBS 
on PIAAAS matter morally. 
Neuroethical analyses on the effects 
of DBS should attend to relevant 
levels of evidence hierarchies, 
such as the one outlined by the 
Centre for Evidence-Based Medi- 
cine. 
DBS for anorexia can have 
implications for authenticity, 
considering empirically-based 
mechanistic reasoning that ac- 
counts for features of AN and the 
brain regions being targeted for 
stimulation. 
Developing an instrument for 
autonomy can be aided by 
understanding traditional, 
experiential, and relational 
conceptions of autonomy and their 
causal interdependence. 
Presents 10 cases of people with PD 
who received DBS and developed 
behavioural and psychiatric 
symptoms, which were reduced 
after stimulation adjustment or 
lead repositioning. Three of these 
patients have no prior psychiatric 
history. 
A qualitative interview of 10 
patient-caregiver dyads demon- 
strates that actions or urges were a 
result of the brain being more 
active, and that DBS facilitated or 
allowed re-emergence of a 
younger, more energetic and 
extraverted, and real self that PD 
took away. 
None of the participants considered 
that a change in identity had been 
precipitated by DBS, but some 
perceived that their autonomy had 
been overridden, especially for 
symptoms with negative 
consequences. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Author/s (Year) Title Purpose of response Main arguments and/or findings 
 
 














































On the Significance of the Identity 
Debate in DBS and the Need of an 
Inclusive Research Agenda. A 








































Changes in Personality Associated 
with Deep Brain Stimulation: a 
Qualitative Evaluation of Clinician 
Perspectives 
Criticism: limitations of the search 
strategy; inadequate evidence of 
selective use of empirical findings 
by ethicists; lumping of PIAAAS as 
one; downplaying the contribution 
of ethicists and qualitative research; 





































Empirical evidence: effect of DBS for 
movement and psychiatric disorders 
on personality 
There is little evidence provided on 
the claims that there is minimal 
empirical proof for PIAAAS 
changes due to DBS and that 
ethicists use empirical literature 
selectively, scantly, exaggeratedly, 
or out of context. For instance, de 
Haan’s paper reports how OCD 
patients’ self-experiences, relation 
to the world, and reflective 
attitudes change following DBS. 
Not being able to establish a simple 
mono-causality should not be a 
ground to dismiss DBS as a factor 
that influences PIAAAS, and its 
corresponding ethical relevance. 
The concepts of personality, identity, 
agency, autonomy, authenticity, 
and the self are lumped together by 
Gilbert et al., without properly 
defining each one and what 
qualifies as a change. It is also 
unfortunate that they concluded 
that PIAAAS should remain in the 
domain of philosophical instead of 
empirical research. 
One could wonder if PIAAAS 
measures will be sufficiently 
developed, given that it is easy to 
mean different things using the 
same word. 
Our bodies and our agency are not 
separate from each other, and thus, 
an altered body image is a threat to 
agency. 
Gilbert et al. risk regressing the 
debate by proposing a hierarchy of 
sciences with certain quantitative 
methods on top and qualitative 
research and ethical analysis at the 
bottom. Doing this risks muting 
patient voices in disentangling the 
influence of DBS on PIAAAS. 
Personality changes can be broadly 
defined as changes in cognition, 
feeling, and behaviour. 
Qualitative interview of 16 DBS 
clinicians for movement and 
psychiatric disorders showed that 
transient personality changes often 
occur within the first three months 
of DBS. 
Clinicians working within psychiatric 
conditions did not describe 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Author/s (Year) Title Purpose of response Main arguments and/or findings 
 
changes in patient personality 
following DBS. 
Majority of clinicians believed that 
changes in personality were 
attributable to a variety of causes, 
including the DBS, as well as 
psychosocial, pathological and 
pharmacological factors. 
 
magnitude, and mechanism for changes to the three 
domains of autonomy in the DBS recipient. This instru- 
ment then provides an overall (autonomy) score that 
also incorporates a DBS recipient’s particular view of 
autonomy. Indeed, more work needs to be done to 
disentangle what personality, identity, agency, authen- 
ticity, autonomy, and self really mean and to facilitate a 
collaborative discussion amongst academics from vari- 
ous disciplines, patients suffering from neurological or 
psychiatric disorders, and relatives and caregivers. Only 
by establishing a collaborative and multidisciplinary 
partnership can we develop instruments that compre- 
hensively captures the incidence and extent of PIAAAS 
changes [17]. Results gained from such an integrated 
research approach would be useful in the informed 
consent process and in anticipating, mitigating, and 
managing any detrimental or unwanted effects associat- 
ed with the influence of DBS on neural mechanisms. 
 
 
Providing Empirical Evidence about PIAAAS 
 
Several researchers present results from their own em- 
pirical studies to better delineate the extent of the effects 
of DBS on PIAAAS. The qualitative interviews (involv- 
ing 10 patient-caregiver dyads) by Mosley et al. [7] 
show how certain behavioural and psychiatric symp- 
toms led to spousal caregiver burden and how these 
DBS-associated symptoms could affect attribution, re- 
sponsibility, authenticity, and control. Interestingly, 
none of the people Mosley et al. [7] interviewed raised 
concerns about identity, which could signify that al- 
though DBS might lead to the expression of inauthentic 
behaviours, it does not lead to a shift in a person’s 
underlying authentic selfhood. Kubu et al. [3] also share 
results from their work involving patients with PD (who 
received DBS) and their caregivers. Kubu and 
colleagues demonstrate how DBS can significantly im- 
prove patients’ perceptions of control in vital aspects of 
their lives, particularly those reflecting their values. 
They also illustrate the need to view DBS-associated 
personality changes in light of personality changes due 
to PD, considering that PD is associated with more 
negative personality changes while DBS is associated 
with more positive ones. Aligning with these findings, 
we believe it is probably a romantic view to see neuro- 
degeneration in the substantia nigra as deteriorating only 
the motor system. It is no surprise that in recent years, 
PD has more and more been characterized as a neuro- 
psychiatric disorder rather than a neurological one [8], 
with potentially major implications for treatment and 
counselling. It is a similarly romantic view to believe 
that the effects of DBS can be confined to a very specific 
subset of neurons and that our anatomical and physio- 
logical knowledge of the underlying network-dynamics 
is at a sufficient level to have full control of what we 
modulate. Therefore, there is a fundamental need for 
studies to investigate the effects of DBS, PD, and other 
factors on PIAAAS. It is important to note that the 
findings of Kubu et al. [3] on how DBS affects control 
differ from those of Mosley et al. [7], who reported a 
perceived loss of control (or free will) in DBS recipients 
who viewed neuropsychiatric symptoms as inauthentic 
and attributable to DBS. 
Thomson et al. [9] present the results of their quali- 
tative interviews involving 16 clinicians working with 
DBS patients who suffered from a movement disorder 
or psychiatric condition. Their results show that clini- 
cians working on DBS for movement disorders reported 
personality changes months after surgery, with most 
being transient and easily addressable through clinical 
intervention. The transient nature of symptoms and their 
close temporal relationship with stimulation adjustment 
led to a number of clinicians directly attributing most 
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personality changes to stimulation. However, other cli- 
nicians also acknowledged other factors such as medi- 
cation and treatment outcome adjustments, disease pro- 
gression, and psychosocial changes as contributors to 
observed personality changes. In contrast to clinicians 
working on DBS for movement disorders, clinicians 
working on psychiatric conditions did not describe pa- 
tients’ adverse events in terms of personality changes 
following DBS, because psychiatric DBS intends to 
change the patient’s personality. These clinicians clas- 
sified any changes in psychiatric symptoms as adverse 
events or restoration of the patient’s pre-morbid person- 
ality. While acknowledging that DBS in the psychiatric 
context aims at intentionally changing the patient’s per- 
sonality, some of the main concerns that motivate the 
ethical and philosophical debates are about whether 
DBS may lead to unintended personality changes. 
Overall, findings from the empirical studies of Thom- 
son et al. [9], Mosley et al. [7], and Kubu et al. [3] 
demonstrate the potential diversity in PIAAAS changes 
experienced by people undergoing DBS therapy. They 
also highlight the need to acknowledge that unintended 
changes in aspects of PIAAAS, in particular personality, 
may be transient in nature and do not necessarily lead to 
drastic changes in a person’s authentic selfhood and iden- 
tity. They further argue that this illustrates that DBS, in 
certain cases, has the potential to restore, rather than 
disrupt or negatively alter, the PIAAAS of the DBS 
recipient [10, 11]. This also aligns with recent quantitative 
and qualitative DBS studies suggesting that: personality 
changes were likely induced by postoperative tapering of 
dopaminergic treatment [12]; identity-related complaints 
were either transient or not associated with fundamental 
postoperative feelings of identity alteration [13]; and psy- 
chological variables did not undergo major changes [14]. 
Mosley et al. [7] and Thomson et al. [9] also state that 
indeed, DBS can cause personality changes, as evidenced 
by the close temporal relation between symptom onset or 
relief and stimulation adjustment; however, both groups 
do not disregard other contributing factors. The empirical 
contributions of Thomson et al. [9], Mosley et al. [7], and 
Kubu et al. [3] add new information to the debate on 
whether DBS may induce unintended PIAAAS changes. 
Although these studies were not conducted using a longi- 
tudinal, prospective, (sham)-controlled study design or 
even intra-individual DBS/sham comparisons—for this 
and other design considerations see e.g. [9]—they still 
provide important data on the nature and duration of 
DBS-associated PIAAAS changes. As will be outlined 
in the next section, the question of causality (i.e. does 
DBS cause unintended postoperative PIAAAS changes) 
needs to be approached in a rather narrow methodological 
sense. There are more methodological degrees of freedom 
when it comes to questions about the nature of PIAAAS 
changes that can “occur” after DBS implantation and 
stimulation, the way patients deal with them, among other 
important questions. In fact, these latter topics would 
tremendously benefit from a multidisciplinary approach. 
 
 
Addressing Criticisms of our Research Approach 
and Findings 
 
The primary aim of our paper [1] is to promote and 
encourage discussion of whether the portrayal of unin- 
tended DBS-induced PIAAAS changes in the academic 
literature is a bubble that needs to be deflated. Several 
authors have reacted to our findings and have chal- 
lenged the claims we made. We have identified four 
major types of criticisms of our work and we will try to 
address them in this section. 
First, a number of responses criticised our search 
strategy and the significance of our findings regarding 
the extent of empirical evidence justifying philosophical 
claims that DBS causes unwanted PIAAAS changes. 
Bluhm and Cabrera [15] suggest that the search terms 
we used have severely restricted the initial set of results 
and have excluded a number of qualitative studies ex- 
amining the experiences of DBS recipients. Snoek et al. 
[16] mention that we have limited evidence for our 
claim that there is minimal empirical proof for DBS- 
caused unintended PIAAAS changes and that ethicists 
use empirical literature selectively, scantly, exaggerat- 
edly, or out of context. They and Pugh et al. also point 
out that not being able to establish a simple mono- 
causality should not be a ground to dismiss DBS as a 
factor that influences PIAAAS, and its corresponding 
ethical [16] and moral relevance [4]. 
We acknowledge the limitations of the search terms 
that we used; however, we would like to emphasise that 
we did not attempt to provide a systematic review on the 
subject matter and that we already acknowledged this 
limitation in our paper. We want to re-emphasise that the 
word “cause” implies scientific causation. To establish 
causality, one would have to test whether normalization 
of function can reverse pathological behaviour. Scien- 
tifically, this is far from a simple task as it requires 
complex study designs (as alluded to in our first 
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publication) and sophisticated tools. Although we ac- 
knowledge the essential value of asking patients and 
family members whether they experienced PIAAAS- 
like changes, as suggested by Snoek et al. [16], qualita- 
tive first-person perspectives are unfortunately not suf- 
ficient to scientifically establish causality. For causality 
testing, the undisputed concepts of necessity and suffi- 
ciency have been proposed (for a critique see [18, 19]). 
This would imply being able to test true ON-OFF con- 
ditions with as few as possible and as controllable as 
possible confounding factors (e.g. drugs, underlying 
disorder, sex, age). We refer to Montgomery for a 
thorough discussion of necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions [20] and only state that a necessary cause implies 
that the effect or the observation (e.g. change in 
PIAAAS) always co-exists with the cause (DBS) whilst 
a sufficient cause implies that each time the presumed 
cause (DBS) is present, the observation (PIAAAS) must 
be present. If DBS is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
cause of PIAAAS, then it is epiphenomenal. The work 
of causality testing in DBS research in the context of 
PIAAAS has yet to be done and calls for meticulously 
planned study designs for understanding DBS's mecha- 
nisms of action. There is an important difference be- 
tween saying that unanticipated changes in PIAAAS 
occur after DBS because of the technology and saying 
that these changes can occur in general. The question of 
causality not only makes a difference in discussions on a 
theoretical level but also in the context of counselling 
patients. Finally, we certainly do not mean to say that an 
unintended PIAAAS change is only ethically problem- 
atic if it results from DBS directly (mono-causality 
[16]); however, we believe that it is inherently problem- 
atic to specifically claim that “DBS causes PIAAAS” in 
the absence of robust empirical evidence that scientifi- 
cally establishes causation, as highlighted above. 
The second type of criticism is of our use of the 
acronym “PIAAAS” and our recommendation of devel- 
oping instruments that would help measure the inci- 
dence and extent of PIAAAS changes. Snoek et al. 
[16] criticise our lumping together of personality, iden- 
tity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self into a 
unitary concept (PIAAAS) without properly defining 
each component and what qualifies as a change. They 
also doubt the possibility of sufficiently developing 
PIAAAS measures given the multiple definitions and 
conceptions of personality, identity, agency, authentici- 
ty, autonomy, and self [16]. Erler [5] then points out that 
the limitations in fully operationalising or reducing 
PIAAAS components does not make PIAAAS less re- 
spectable concepts used in discussions of neuroethics. 
Moreover, Bluhm and Cabrera [15] bring up how 
PIAAAS instruments will not accurately reflect or cap- 
ture patients’ experiences and how the incidence rates 
derived from these instruments would tell very little 
about the nature of PIAAAS changes or the best way 
to help patients cope with them. 
We would like to clarify that we are not suggesting 
PIAAAS is a unitary concept in the neuroethics litera- 
ture; rather, we use this acronym to refer to changes in 
personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, 
and/or self. Someone could have changes in personality 
without necessarily feeling or experiencing an altered 
selfhood, as suggested by the results of Mosley et al. [7]. 
We agree that it would indeed be challenging to develop 
certain PIAAAS measures, considering that even 
neuroethicists disagree among themselves on how to 
best define and encapsulate these terms. However, by 
no means should this deter efforts in developing instru- 
ments that can capture changes in PIAAAS. [17] To 
develop a framework for better understanding and mea- 
suring changes in PIAAAS during DBS (or any other 
medical intervention), we envision developing a strate- 
gy similar to the development of the Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) for understanding mental disorders. 
That strategy has aimed at de-emphasizing illness defi- 
nitions as a starting point; instead, it seeks biological 
underpinnings and current understandings of behaviour- 
brain relationships and links them to clinical phenome- 
non [21, 22]. Based on our (FG & CI) experience of 
instrument development [8, 17, 23, 24], we are aware of 
the high demands that are needed for developing reliable 
and valid instruments that measure complex traits that 
indicate changes to PIAAAS. We are also aware that a 
quantitative PIAAAS instrument would not comprehen- 
sively reflect patients’ experiences and the nature of any 
changes [17]. However, if we are to methodologically 
scrutinise the link between DBS and PIAAAS, we need 
instruments that can compare the extent and frequency 
of PIAAAS changes between patients who are under- 
going DBS therapy and patients receiving standard or 
other clinical interventions. 
The third type of criticism is associated with our 
point regarding how the responses “I feel like a robot” 
and “I feel like an electric doll” from Schupbach et al.’s 
[25] interviews do not necessarily indicate impaired 
autonomy, but rather, an altered body image. Snoek 
et al. [16] emphasise that our bodies and our agency 
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are not separate from each other, and thus, an altered 
body image is a threat to agency. They state that the 
relationship between body and agency becomes appar- 
ent when the body stops functioning or regains lost 
capacities. To clarify, we are also not of the opinion that 
the body and agency are separate from each other. 
However, we would like to underscore that the state- 
ments from Schupbach’s interviewees pertain more to 
body image—as a result of having a pulse generator and 
electrodes in them—than bodily function. Schupbach 
et al. (p. 1814; [25]) even propose that “the altered body 
image may result from difficulty in accepting psycho- 
logically the implanted material”. Whether or not this 
altered body image has drastically affected the capacity 
of DBS recipients to act as agents is not discussed in 
Schupbach et al.’s [25] work. This highlights the need 
for us, as neuroethicists, to acknowledge the highly 
speculative nature of some of our claims, especially 
those based on short qualitative statements that have 
limited accompanying contextual information. As 
tempting as it is to interpret the statements regarding 
feeling like a robot or an electric doll as pertaining not 
just to an altered body image but also to the feeling of 
being controlled by the DBS apparatus, the only way to 
know if this really is the case is to review the original 
full-length interview transcript and/or interview again 
the DBS recipients who made such statements. Accord- 
ingly, one would have to determine if they also 
contextualised such mechanised feelings in terms of 
diminished capacity for agency. 
The fourth and final set of criticisms pertains to our 
points regarding the methodological inadequacies of 
qualitative studies and case reports in determining 
whether DBS causes unanticipated PIAAAS changes 
and on how randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are 
well suited to address the causality question. Bluhm 
and Cabrera [15] point out that RCTs are bad at identi- 
fying rare side effects, in addition to not giving infor- 
mation about factors that influence PIAAAS experi- 
ences. Pugh et al. [4] also claim that RCTs might not 
be able to tell us whether DBS directly causes person- 
ality changes. Other researchers highlight the impor- 
tance of not dismissing case studies, for they can help 
to inform theoretical papers of the normative implica- 
tions of DBS-related changes [15]. Snoek et al. [16] 
warn that we risk regressing the debate by proposing a 
hierarchy of sciences with certain quantitative methods 
on top and qualitative research and ethical analysis at the 
bottom. 
In reply, we first would like to underscore that we did 
not say that qualitative studies and ethical reflection are 
of minimal or subordinate value. Inquiries regarding the 
nature of PIAAAS changes, the extent to which they 
affect the lived experience of a patient receiving DBS 
and his/her caregivers, and the normative implications 
of such changes requires more than quantitative studies, 
and this is where qualitative research and case reports 
are fundamental for adequately comprehensive research. 
Furthermore, in no way do we want to propose a hier- 
archy of disciplines in understanding PIAAAS changes 
associated with DBS. As other responses to our article 
suggest [5, 6], philosophy is an essential aid in the 
clarification of terms and in the development of clinical 
instruments. However, we would like to re-emphasize: 
contrary to some of the claims made in response to our 
article, we are of the firm opinion that there is a need for 
scientific study designs to answer the “causality” ques- 
tion because apart from theoretical discussions about the 
logic(s) of causality, this question needs to be addressed 
by empirical experiments that use appropriate study 
designs capable of disentangling DBS effects from po- 
tential confounders. In recruiting participants, designing 
the study, and statistically analysing the results, RCTs 
can control and account for other factors leading to 
PIAAAS changes, including but not limited to disease 
type, duration, and severity; stimulation parameters; and 
medication regime. Furthermore, the capacity of an 
RCT to identify rare effects ultimately depends on the 
sample - and effect size of the underlying construct. If 
certain PIAAAS changes are indeed rare, then this could 
actually represent a bubble in terms of how their prev- 
alence is portrayed. 
We would also like to point out that although the 
within-patient study design proposed by Pugh et al. [4] 
has its appeals, it may face real-world issues, such as the 
fact that we cannot assume that PIAAAS-changes can 
be modulated instantly and therefore could not easily be 
tested in ON vs OFF conditions. DBS may be associated 
with long-term synaptic changes [26] that cannot be 
undone by simply turning off the stimulation. Changes 
in drugs that often have been used over decades further 
complicates the issue. Hence, while we agree that ap- 
proaching the question of causality is difficult, there are 
study designs, in this regard, that are clearly better and 
yield more robust information. Pre-clinical causality 
testing using animal models of DBS might provide 
potential support as well. If it were true that DBS causes 
unwanted PIAAAS, this information would be of great 
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clinical significance, given the advent of alternative 
modulation possibilities through current steering, stim- 
ulation adjustment, or in some cases, lead repositioning 
[7] and other neuromodulation techniques. 
Overall, we acknowledge the importance of multiple 
perspectives and open deliberation [3] in discussing 
whether DBS is associated with PIAAAS, and we hope 
that this section serves as a starting point for further 
conversations and investigations on this topic. Hopeful- 
ly, future empirical work on this topic will also provide 
theoretical neuroethicists with additional material to 
reflect on, facilitating more comprehensive and 
evidence-based discussions regarding the extent of the 
effects of DBS on unintended PIAAAS and on their 
relevance to DBS recipients, their caregivers, and the 





This special issue provides a unique opportunity for 
interdisciplinary researchers examining unintended 
DBS-associated PIAAAS changes to reflect on the issue 
in light of the evidence that we presented in our paper, 
“Deflating the ‘DBS causes personality changes’ bub- 
ble” [1]. We greatly appreciate the various commentar- 
ies provided which assess the validity and significance 
of our initial arguments [1]. We hope this special issue 
will be a starting point for fostering a fruitful collabora- 
tion among neuroethicists from various disciplines, phi- 
losophers, medical personnel treating patients with neu- 
rological and/or psychiatric conditions, and patients and 
their caregivers [27–45]. 
We neuroethicists should be careful in endorsing any 
conclusion, positive or negative, about whether DBS 
causes unintended PIAAAS changes. A precautionary 
conclusion might be to subscribe to an agnostic view. 
Any conclusion drawn should be based on replicable 
and valid data. Furthermore, when advocating for a 
conclusion, we should use language that is patient- 
centred, especially since it may then be more useful 
for helping to guide patients to make decisions aligning 
with their personal values and preferences. The difficul- 
ty in concluding whether DBS causes unintended 
PIAAAS changes is great because of both an underlying 
measurement problem (i.e. the frequency of complex 
side effects is difficult to estimate) and an evaluation 
problem (i.e. the retrospective assessment can signifi- 
cantly  differ  between  patients,  their  relatives, and 
physicians) [46]. Unintended postoperative putative 
changes to PIAAAS remain a critical ethical 
concern. It is beyond dispute that we need to develop 
reliable and valid instruments able to measure complex 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural changes post- 
operatively in order to investigate whether changes in 
PIAAAS are attributable to DBS alone. We too need to 
uphold what all professionals in the field ultimately 
strive for: adherence to the highest scientific standards. 
Equally critical is a need for more empirical and well- 
grounded conceptual neuroethics discussions on the 
topic of DBS and PIAAAS. At stake are profound 
implications for patients’ decisions and lives. It is not 
enough to say that DBS may result in changes in 
PIAAAS. Instead we must strive to indicate the extent, 
in terms of magnitude and persistence, of these changes 
and the availability of strategies to mitigate them. 
Achieving this will require no less than the tools, knowl- 
edge, and perspectives of multiple disciplines. 
Neuroethics, both empirical and conceptual, is a field 
that is inherently multidisciplinary. Only by fostering an 
open dialogue can we ensure that relevant discussions in 
the ethics of neuroscience are properly grounded and do 
not become an impenetrable bubble detached from em- 
pirical evidence and from the actual lived experience of 
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